Why do publicly listed firms go private in Europe? by Lapa, Sofia Henriques da Silva
 










Why do Publicly Listed Firms 


















Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in 
Finance, at Universidade Católica Portuguesa and for the MSc in Management, 




















The literature on the going private (GP) decision in Europe often studies the determinants of 
public to private transactions in one specific or a small number of countries. Studies elaborate 
on different firm-specific factors, although frequently neglecting the importance of the macro 
environment. Additionally, the logit analysis is the primary statistical tool of analysis exploited. 
This study examines the determinants of the GP decision in Europe by performing univariate, 
logit and survival analyses. The Cox Proportional-Hazard Model is used to consider the impact 
of time-varying firm-specific and macro environment characteristics, as well as the duration of 
public life, on the likelihood of a firm going private. 
A sample of 1,735 firms from 39 different European countries, which went private between 
1985 and 2020, is contrasted to 5,684 companies that remain publicly listed in Europe. 
Results suggest GP firms to be smaller and undervalued, have lower stock liquidity, larger 
leverage and to have experienced lower abnormal returns than companies that remain public. 
Evidence highlights European markets to be more fit for large companies and that GP firms 
may need a capital restructuring. Furthermore, it also indicates benefits of liquidity and having 
a price which captures the value of the company to be decisive for publicly listed firms. 
Moreover, strong evidence is found of the importance of the macro environment, such as the 
existence of alternative sources of financing. Finally, country-specific characteristics affect the 
determinants of the decision to go private in Europe. 
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Na literatura, são habitualmente estudados os determinantes da decisão de saída da bolsa na 
Europa num único país ou num pequeno grupo de países. Esses estudos analisam os diferentes 
fatores específicos das empresas, negligenciando frequentemente a influência do ambiente 
macroeconómico. A principal ferramenta estatística utilizada é análise logística. 
Neste estudo são examinados os determinantes da decisão de uma empresa cotada sair da bolsa 
na Europa, utilizando a análise univariada, logística e de sobrevivência. O modelo Cox 
Proportional-Hazard é usado para estudar o impacto da variação ao longo do tempo das 
características específicas das empresas e do ambiente macroeconómico, bem como da duração 
de permanência na bolsa, na possibilidade de uma empresa se tornar privada. 
Uma amostra de 1735 empresas de 39 países europeus, que saíram da bolsa entre 1985 e 2020, 
é comparada a 5684 empresas que permanecem cotadas nas bolsas europeias. 
Os resultados sugerem que as empresas que saíram da bolsa são mais pequenas e subavaliadas, 
a liquidez das suas ações é menor, têm mais alavancagem e apresentam retornos anormais 
baixos. A análise evidencia que os mercados de capitais europeus são mais adequados para 
grandes empresas e que aquelas que saíram da bolsa podem precisar de uma reestruturação de 
capital. A liquidez das ações e a existência de um preço que reflita o valor da empresa são 
benefícios importantes na decisão de permanência na bolsa. 
Adicionalmente, os fatores macroeconómicos, bem como as características específicas dos 
países, impactam significativamente a decisão de saída. 
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Modern companies have their origin on the creation of East India companies in the 1600s. These 
companies were created as joint-stock companies, corporations owned by different investors 
whose stake on the firm depend on the number of stocks purchased. These early limited liability 
corporations allowed ship owners to decrease their risk exposure to unsuccessful endeavors to 
Oriental countries by raising investors to finance the voyages in exchange for a share of 
commercial profits, under the form of dividends. Shares were issued in paper and traded among 
investors in London coffee houses. 
The creation of joint-stock companies highlights two main benefits for firms of having a 
diversified pool of investors: access to funding and risk dispersion. Nevertheless, many other 
benefits exist, mainly stock liquidity, the availability of a public stock price that incorporates 
all available information on a company or the creation of a stock currency to engage in M&A 
transactions. Additionally, it allows early investors to cash out and contributes to increased 
transparency and publicity, among others. 
Indeed, the advantages for a company to be publicly listed are extensive and the associated 
costs of a listing procedure substantial, such as legal, advisory and accounting costs, fees and 
regulatory compliances. This raises the question of what could potentially cause a company to 
go back on its decision and go private? 
In reality, being a public company is not all benefits. Publicly listed companies are subject to 
extensive regulatory and disclosure requirements and periodic compliance costs. They are 
arguably more vulnerable to takeovers and may suffer from incentive misalignment between 
the management and investors or between large and small shareholders. These costs are likely 
to impact differently each company, which raises a second question, deeply connected to the 
first one. Are firms which go private different from the ones that remain public? 
Moreover, specialists highlight that, currently, the availability of private funds and the 
narrowing, or possible inversion, of the valuation premiums that, traditionally, public 
companies enjoy over private companies, are expected to boost the GP markets (Anthony, 
2020). Additionally, the current low interest rate environment in Europe, which facilitates 
financing at low cost, and the large amount of funds Private Equities (PEs) dispose of is 
expected to lift the GP market in Europe (Hodgson, 2019).  
Public to private transactions have been subject to a considerable number of studies, especially 
in the US. Despite literature displaying a substantial repetition on the motivations considered, 
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they vary in the number of drivers studied, the analyses performed, time frames and 
geographical regions. While some researchers study a factor, they theorize to be significantly 
important for companies in a specific country (e.g. Belkhir et al., 2013), others take into account 
a broader set of possible motivations (Renneboog et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the factors 
considered are systematically firm-specific and little studies consider macro variables as 
important delisting drivers. Furthermore, previous studies in Europe often focus on only one 
country or a small number of countries and frequently exclude Scandinavia and South and East 
Europe. Additionally, relatively short time frames are also considered, decreasing the number 
of observations and potentially affecting the applicability of results to a larger sample. 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) are one of the most exhaustive studies in this field, analyzing the 
impact of a broad set of firm-specific and macro environment variables on the motivations 
behind a GP decision in the United States (US). In addition to a univariate and logit analysis, 
these researchers perform survival analysis, commonly used in clinical trials, to study the 
determinants of GP transactions. 
Following Bharath & Dittmar (2010)’s methodology, this study presents the results of a 
univariate, logit and survival analysis, using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model, on the relation 
between both firm-specific and macro environment characteristics and the decision to go private 
in Europe. The GP sample comprises 1,735 firms which went private between 1985 and 2020 
in 39 European countries, including all North, Center, South and East regions. These companies 
are compared to 5,684 companies that remain, to the data collection date, publicly listed in all 
European countries considered in this study and for which there is data available on DataStream 
database. Data on GP deals was collected from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database 
and companies’ financial data was retrieved from DataStream. 
In accordance with previous literature on both going public and GP decisions, a broad set of 
hypotheses is tested, namely considerations on firm size, information availability, access to 
capital, liquidity, the agency theory, corporate control, stock market performance, business 
cycle and agent confidence, PE investment and alternative sources of financing.  
This study’s sample indicates the average GP European firm to take 11 years to exit public 
markets, two years less than what is observed by Bharath & Dittmar (2010) in the US. The year 
in which more public to private transactions were held was 2003 (105 deals), closely followed 
by 2011 (100 deals), the year in which the sovereign debt crisis hit Europe. These numbers 
represent small peaks in a pattern of public to private transactions volumes that seems to be 
 6 
relatively well described by short and low-frequency cycles. Moreover, the countries that 
register higher public stock market exits are the United Kingdom (UK), accounting for 34.4% 
of the GP sample, France (14.2%), Germany (7.4%) and Sweden (7%). 
This empirical study starts with a univariate analysis that compares mean and median values of 
firm characteristics, such as sales, stock turnover, free cash flow or leverage, of the GP and 
control samples at Initial Public Offering (IPO) year. Furthermore, it also compares GP firm-
characteristics at the listing year and at the year prior to the stock delisting. Subsequently, a 
logit analysis is used to determine whether GP firm-characteristics at IPO can determine the GP 
decision. Finally, the Cox Hazard Model, which allows to analyze the effect of time on firm-
specific and macro environment characteristics, as well as the duration of public life, is used to 
test the hypotheses. This model establishes a relation between the different considered 
characteristics and the likelihood of a firm going private. The study is complemented with a 
subsample analysis, by constructing four country groups of similar characteristics, to examine 
whether the country-specific environment impacts results. 
This study emphasizes European markets to be less suited for small companies, what could 
eventually be explained by the high costs associated with being a publicly listed firm, as a large 
share of those costs is independent of firm size. Furthermore, it could also be explained by a 
lack of stock liquidity of small firms as investors might be reluctant to invest in these shares or 
are unaware of its existence. Furthermore, although GP firms exhibit lower amounts of leverage 
at the listing year, the likelihood of a firm going private increases with the amount of leverage 
a company acquires over its public life. In turn, this suggests GP firms to have difficulties in 
raising capital through equity markets, something which could be linked to illiquidity or lack 
of investment recognition or confidence. The macro environment is also found to be decisive. 
Additionally, differences in countries’ corporate cultural, legal environment or financial 
markets attributes are likely to influence the determinants of GP transactions in Europe. 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) found similar results on leverage, liquidity and macro variables 
importance in the US. Nevertheless, while researchers did not find evidence of size being an 
important determinant, contrarily to this study, their paper supports the importance of access to 
capital for financially constrained companies, the significance of control considerations and 
agency problems to be relevant in an early sample period. 
These findings could potentially benefit European financial markets regulators in efforts to 
improve the quality of European stock markets. Regulators should focus on financial markets 
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fit for small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) and liquidity concerns, keeping in mind the 
country’s corporate and stock market setting. Moreover, company managers should carefully 
evaluate whether benefits of being publicly listed considerably outweigh the costs, as changes 
in firm characteristics or the macro environment can invert this balance and stock listings are 
expensive and most costs non-redeemable. 
This study is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents the literature review of recent 
studies on the GP decision, mainly in Europe. Chapter 3 shortly reviews the regulatory 
requirements of public companies in the European Union. Chapter 4 describes the hypotheses 
considered in this study. Chapter 5 presents the methodology followed in the empirical study. 
Chapter 6 introduces the data collection and treatment, as well as the descriptive statistics on 
this study’s sample. Chapter 7 presents the results and chapter 8 the conclusions and suggestions 





2. Literature Review 
 
Studies such as Jensen (1986), Lehn & Poulsen (1989) or Jensen & Murphy (1990) found some 
of the earliest and most important results in this field of study of corporate finance. Nevertheless, 
although these papers’ hypotheses and results were considered in this dissertation, especially 
for hypothesis creation, they will not be considered in this literature review. Instead, more 
recent research papers will be discussed in this section and more emphasis will be given to 
studies developed in the European markets. 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) study the motivations of the GP decision, using a sample of 1,023 
firms, which exited US public markets between 1980 and 2004, and compare it to 6,464 firms 
that remained publicly listed. In their analysis, researchers consider the effect of firm-specific 
characteristics (information, access to capital, liquidity, corporate control and agency problems), 
as well as, of macro variables (investor sentiment, term premium, default risk premium, bank 
loans and IPO and PE markets) on how firms weigh the benefits and costs of remaining public. 
The authors recur to a broad set of statistical tools, such as parametric mean comparison tests, 
non-parametric median comparison tests, logit analysis and the Cox Proportional Hazard Model. 
Further, out-of-sample forecasts were also performed. 
One could argue, Bharath & Dittmar (2010) key finding to be that, in addition to the path a firm 
takes during its public life, firm characteristics at IPO can with reasonable accuracy predict 
whether a firm ultimately goes private. While their Cox Hazard model, using panel data, can 
predict which firms go private with 83.3% accuracy, their logit model, using cross-sectional 
data at the time of the IPO, can accurately predict 81.7% of the times a GP transaction. 
Moreover, the authors found strong evidence of information availability and stock liquidity 
considerations. Agency problems proxied to free cash flow only affect the GP decision before 
the 1990s and, although weaker, the researchers also found support for the control and access 
to capital hypotheses. Additionally, all macro variables considered are also found to be 
statistically significant, except for IPO value. To conclude, control and access to capital 
variables are absorbed by macro variables, suggesting these factors to be related to macro 
conditions.  
Belkhir et al. (2013) focus their analysis on the effects of agency problems and excess control 
on the likelihood of French firms’ delisting. Since, according to the authors, firms in France are 
characterized by a high level of ownership concentration, companies are more prone to 
experience agency problems between large and small shareholders, rather than between 
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managers and investors. The researchers compare two equally sized samples of firms matched 
by a propensity-score. Their study sample or GP sample comprises 167 corporations that went 
private in France between 1997 and 2009, while their control sample includes 167 firms that 
remained public for that period. The authors find agency problems between large controlling 
shareholders and small investors to deteriorate the attractiveness of a firm to market investors, 
consequently decreasing liquidity and the benefits of firms remaining publicly listed. In turn, 
large controlling shareholders would then be more prone to delist the firm themselves or to 
accept a takeover proposal.  
Furthermore, they also find GP firms to hold larger amounts of free cash flows and to be 
undervalued before the transaction. No evidence was found for the hypothesis that tax savings, 
low growth opportunities and takeover threats impact the likelihood of a delisting. These results 
were obtained using mean comparison tests and logit regressions and checked for robustness 
with a sensitivity analysis. 
In the Italian corporate landscape, Bettinelli et al. (2011) also study the effects of agency 
problems on the GP decision, using a sample of 381 companies publicly listed between 2001 
and 2008. According to the researchers, there is often no difference between management and 
ownership, in Italian companies. Thus, believing agency problems would most likely arise due 
to information asymmetries between majority and minority shareholders. Their two main 
hypotheses are that firms with concentrated ownership, in a necessity of realigning incentives, 
and small companies, experiencing a higher degree of information asymmetries relating the real 
value of the company, are more likely to go private. Using the General Linear Model, 
researchers find evidence for the concentrated ownership’s influence. However, they do not 
find a relation between size and the GP decision. Moreover, the authors use a logit analysis to 
study whether speculation and firm characteristics (as measured by the book value per share) 
influence the probability of a delisting. Nevertheless, they do not find proof for their hypothesis, 
possibly due to the lack of data. 
Renneboog et al. (2006) study the decision to go private of the firm in the UK in a slightly 
different manner than described previously. In place of logit models, the authors do a premium 
analysis and an event study around the delisting date, computing cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs), to define the sources and magnitudes of shareholder gains in such 
transactions. The idea is thus to identify the underlying incentives of a delisting through an 
evaluation of shareholder gains, which assumes a strong relationship between abnormal returns 
 10 
of shareholders and the motivations to go private. This analysis has limitations, as different 
factors may cause abnormal returns, yet being uncorrelated to the GP decision. 
The study is performed using a sample of 177 firms which went private during what the authors 
identify as the second wave of GP transactions in the UK (1997-2003). This paper makes a 
more extensive analysis of the potential drivers of GP transactions, considering the effect of tax 
benefits, interest realignment, corporate control, free cash flow, transaction costs, takeover 
defenses and undervaluation. 
On one hand, results support strongest the positive correlation between undervaluation pre-deal 
and shareholder gains, especially in management buyouts (MBO) and institutional buyouts 
(IBO), as, due to information asymmetries, incumbents are more prone to explore better 
undervaluation opportunities. Furthermore, results also sustain the incentive realignment 
hypothesis, which says that low levels of pre-deal managerial equity ownership in MBOs and 
IBOs lead to more shareholder gains, as there is scope to increase shareholder ownership and 
improve alignment of interests. Moreover, the hypothesis that costs associated with keeping a 
firm listed on a stock exchange are a driver of market exits is not found to be false. However, 
due to the difficulty in measuring such costs, the authors are reluctant to affirm its veracity. 
Additionally, findings also support control considerations, as lower gains are associated with a 
higher level of concentrated ownership of outside shareholders, due to low scope for 
improvement. 
On the other hand, tax shield considerations are not found to be relevant, despite high premiums 
being associated with low levels of pre-transaction corporate debt. The hypothesis that firms 
are taken private to reduce free cash flows, decreasing agency problems, is also not sustained. 
Finally, managers are not found to pay more for firms under threat of an undesired takeover bid. 
Finally, Sannajust, et al. (2015) study the GP decision internationally. This paper’s sample 
includes 535 public market exists between 2000 and 2010 in the US, Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and Asia. This GP sample is compared to a 
similar number of firms, controlled by size, location, business sector and stock quotation. This 
paper also considers a broad set of firm-specific variables: tax savings, incentive realignment, 
control considerations, free cash flow, growth prospects, takeover defenses and undervaluation. 
Authors find the non-country-specific typical GP firm to be undervalued before the transaction 
and to have low managerial share, significant cash flows, a weak growth outlook, low stock 
liquidity and dispersed capital (low level of institutional, corporation or family control). Note 
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that results of control are different from the ones found in France (Belkhir et al., 2013), Italy 
(Bettinelli et al. (2011) and UK (Renneboog et al., 2006). This finding might be explained by 
the important role of “family block-holder”1 ownership identified in European countries by 
Sannajust, et al. (2015) Researchers find reasoning on the agency problems generated by the 
lack of monitoring associated with a dispersed shareholder base, which are minimized when 
the concentration of ownership escalates in a GP transaction.  
Similarly to this study, Sannajust, et al. (2015) perform parametric (t-student) and non-
parametric (Wilcoxon) tests and a logit analysis, using data variables at the year prior to stock 
delisting. In this way, the paper does not consider the effect of time-varying characteristics.  
In Europe, results highlight high concentration of management and family ownership in GP 
firms, as well as a low level of stock liquidity, high cash flows, undervaluation and low growth 
prospects. According to Jensen (1986), firms with low growth expectations are more likely to 
exit public markets, as they are linked to poor management. Furthermore, no evidence for 
takeover defenses, taxation and gearing considerations was found.  
In the UK results are similar to Continental Europe except for the statistical significance of 
“family block-holder”. In fact, a larger “institutional block-holder” and a smaller “family block-
holder” are observed in delisting companies in the UK than in Continental Europe. In the US, 
results were similar to the ones found in the UK. In Asia, authors only find takeover defenses 




1 Block-holder variables are dummy variables equal to 1 when the shareholder group in stake has at least 5% 
ownership in that firm and 0 otherwise. 
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3. Legal Environment 
 
According to La Porta et al. (1997), the legal framework of each country has implications on 
the size and extent of a country’s capital markets, suggesting that the laws in place and their 
enforcement may cause different countries’ markets to vary in terms of market capitalization 
and number of IPOs. In this way, the legal environment of the countries in study may play an 
essential role on the results obtained and how they compare to findings in the US market on a 
firm’s decision to go private. Moreover, while a good legal environment increases the 
confidence of financial market agents to invest in securities (La Porta et al., 1997), 
overburdening firms with administrative and legal work may counteract the benefits of being 
public. Engel et al. (2007) study the response of firms to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) Act of 20022 in the US, and find evidence that, when the costs of complying with the 
additional regulations outweigh the benefits of additional transparency and enhanced corporate 
governance associated with the SOX Act, firms go private. 
Publicly listed companies in Europe are subject to a number of rules and regulations. 
Companies considered in this study were publicly listed in 39 different countries in Europe, 
making it extensive and out of scope of this study to review all country-specific legal 
requirements for public companies. Nevertheless, the EU laws apply to 28 of those countries3, 
which may be considered a representative sample. 
Publicly listed companies in any stock exchange of an EU country are subject to financial 
reporting regulations and transparency requirements. These require public companies, 
independently of their size, to prepare half-yearly and yearly consolidated financial reports in 
accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and publish 
information regarding major changes on the holding voting rights and ad hoc inside information 
which could affect the securities’ price. Furthermore, to raise capital through public offerings, 
companies must offer investors a prospectus, a legal document containing all information 
needed for market participants to make an informed investment decision. Additionally, firms 
of large public-interest and which employ more than 500 workers are subject to non-financial 
reporting policies. These require companies to include non-financial statements in their annual 
reports from 2018 onwards, which comprise detailed information on how enterprises operate 
and manage social and environmental challenges, such as social responsibility and treatment of 
 
2 Approved in 2002, in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act aims to improve the protection of investors from 
fraudulent acts undertaken by publicly listed companies. 
3 UK is included as the Brexit took place after the period in study. 
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human rights. Finally, firms operating in some industries, such as mining and forestry, must 
report on a country-by-country basis on the taxes, royalties and bonuses that they pay 
worldwide.4 
Despite limited liability companies operating in the EU having to deliver annual financial 
statements to the relevant national business register, the additional requirements that listed 
companies in Europe are subject to may constitute a burden and be associated with high 
expenses. These effects are likely to strike harder SMEs, since costs and requirements are, in 
general, not proportional to firm size or profitability.  Pagano et al. (1998) find fixed costs for 
publicly listed companies in Italy to be around $250,000 and variable costs to be 3.5% of gross 
proceeds. 
In fact, despite the benefits of being a publicly listed company, European public markets are 
recording lower levels of new issuers, especially SMEs whose IPO levels are currently half 
compared to levels prior to the financial crisis of 2008. Two potential sources for this problem 
can be identified. First, compliance costs to list on public markets are high and, second, liquidity 
is insufficient, which can make investors unwilling to invest on SMEs’ stocks and increase the 
cost of capital for issuers.5 
Furthermore, previous papers which study a firm’s decision to go public in Europe find the 
median age of Continental European firms at IPO to be significantly higher than Anglo-Saxon 
country-based firms. While Loughran & Ritter (2004) find the median age of US firms for 6,419 
IPOs, from 1980 to 2000, to be 7 years, Schuster (2003), studying 973 IPOs, between 1988 and 
1998, in six countries of Continental Europe and Sweden, find the median age of European 
firms at IPO to be 17 years. This suggest European financial markets to be more suited to mature 
companies. 
To counteract this trend, the European Commission (EC) has put in place, since May 2018, 
more proportionate rules for SMEs. Nevertheless, given that this new legislation has only been 
in place for less than two years of the time period considered in this analysis, it is expected that 




4 Legal requirements were retrieved from the European Commission official website. 
5 Source: European Commission website 
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4. Study Hypothesis 
 
According to exiting literature on both going public and GP decisions, this chapter presents the 
different hypothesis that will be considered in this study, as well as the variables that will be 
used to examine those hypotheses. Appendix 5 displays the variables description. 
 
4.1. Firm-Specific Characteristics 
4.1.1. Size 
 
In the chapter 3, it was highlighted that smaller firms might find it harder to be publicly listed 
due to insufficient liquidity, linked to the lack of investor recognition, and high regulatory 
compliance costs of listed firms, which until a short time ago, in the European Union (EU), 
were independent of firm size. Moreover, the high median age of Continental European 
companies at IPO identified in a variety of papers, may indicate that Continental European 
markets are less suited for small companies. Hence, if SMEs are less likely to file for an IPO, 
it may also be the case that smaller firms are more likely to exit public markets. This paper will 
proxy size to the natural logarithm of market value (MV) or sales.  
Size Hypothesis: Smaller firms are more likely to go private. 
 
4.1.2. Information Atmosphere 
 
Information asymmetries between insiders and investors are common in publicly held firms 
with low level of concentrated ownership and information costly to obtain. Several theories 
draw on the impact of the information atmosphere on the costs and benefits of a firm remaining 
public, taking into account different economic drivers. 
Gheorghiu (2013) considers adverse selection as a source of market failure, as investors’ 
concerns that they might be purchasing a “lemon” negatively impact the average quality of 
firms seeking to go public and the price at which they are subsequently sold. According to 
Leland & Pyle (1977), private firms suffer from information asymmetries at a smaller scale, as 
entrepreneurs can signal the quality of their projects by investing more of their wealth in the 
firm. 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1999) find evidence of high costs associated with the duplication of 
information of publicly listed companies’ investors, which are ultimately passed on to the firm. 
This concern can be mitigated by the availability of a public price that incorporates all available 
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information on the company, assuming market efficiency, thus, liquidity being an important 
factor. 
Merton (1987) shows that expected returns decrease with the degree of investor recognition, 
i.e., the size of the investor base, due to the existence of market frictions in the short to medium 
term that counter the classical model of perfect market information. 
Information asymmetries and frictions can be reduced for firms which have more visibility and 
more information available at lower cost, hence, these firms being less likely to go private. 
Furthermore, a concentrated ownership, as well as a higher degree of institutional ownership 
may also smooth information frictions as these, in general, have easier and ready access to more 
detailed and accurate information. In this way, the number of analysts following a firm, the 
level of institutional holdings and concentrated ownership constitute good proxies to study 
these hypotheses (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010). Nevertheless, due to the incompatibility of the 
required data sources to construct theses variables and the data sources used to construct the 
analyzed sample, or the lack of access to them, the previously stated hypotheses will not be 
studied. Notwithstanding, size is likely also to capture the spillovers of information asymmetry, 
which strengthens the size hypothesis, as Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1995) highlight adverse 
selection problems to be stronger in young and small companies, given their low visibility and 
track record. 
Finally, Subrahmanyam & Titman (2002) find evidence that the benefits of public financing 
are high when information is cheap to obtain and abundant. The authors define serendipitous 
information as insights stock market investors come across in their daily activities and draw on 
the hypothesis that firms would prefer to go private as costs of gathering serendipitous 
information increase. This study will proxy the availability of serendipitous information to the 
ratio of Research and Development Expenditures (R&D) to sales, given that the previously 
mentioned researchers found serendipitous information to be scarcer in high-tech firms. 
Serendipitous Information Hypothesis: Firms with higher availability of serendipitous 
information are less likely to go private. 
 
4.1.3. Funding Considerations 
 
One of the most well-known benefits of being publicly listed is the access to an alternative 
source of funding. Kim & Weisbach (2008) examine the motivations behind public equity offers 
from 38 different countries and find evidence of incremental R&D and capital expenditures, 
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which is consistent with the hypothesis of investment financing. This motivation is even more 
likely to be stronger in firms which have limited access to alternative financing due to high 
leverage or high transaction costs. Consequently, firms with less investment and growth 
opportunities would be more likely to go private and financially constrained firms would prefer 
to remain public to finance their activities. Contrarily, Pagano et al. (1994), which study Italian 
company’s ex ante and ex post the IPO, find companies to go public to rebalance their balance 
sheet, after a period of large investments and growth. Similarly, Subrahmanyam & Titman 
(1999) argue that Germany and other continental European countries rely more on private and 
internal generated capital than US firms. To tap into these considerations, the capital 
expenditures (CAPEX)-to-sales ratio of firms will also be studied. 
Following Bharath & Dittmar (2010), to measure financial constraints the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) 
index and whether a firm distributed dividends or not in a given fiscal year (Dividend Dummy) 
will be used. Notwithstanding, Hadlock & Pierce (2010), among others, cast some doubt on the 
validity of the KZ index and find Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) activity to predict financial 
constraints better and with a high significance level. When costs of accessing external capital 
are high, firms should delay SEO issues. In this way, the number of SEO issues and the 
corresponding amounts raised in a given fiscal year in Europe will be considered. Additionally, 
the annual number of bond issues on the likelihood of a firm going private will also be studied. 
These debt instruments are an appealing alternative source of financing to public equity markets 
and other types of debt financing, as bank loans. In opposition to debt financing, for companies, 
corporate bonds may entail some significant advantageous, such as lower borrowing costs and 
lengthier tenors. Furthermore, corporate bonds are a less permanent means of funding, are 
generally cheaper and entail fewer administrative and disclosure requirements than equity 
financing (Expert Group on European Corporate Bond Markets, 2017). In this way, corporate 
bonds will be studied as an alternative source of financing to equity markets. 
Finally, firms may also want to go public with the goal of minimizing the cost of capital. 
According to Modigliani & Miller (1963), the lower the cost of capital for a firm with a public 
versus a private status, the higher the incentives for a firm to go public. Furthermore, public 
status also allows exposure to competition between financial suppliers and, consequently, 
access to private capital at lower rates (Röell, 1996). Pagano et al. (1994) find Italian companies 
to experience a decrease in the cost of bank credit ex post IPO.  
Financially Constrained Hypothesis 1: Financially constrained firms are less likely to incur in 
a GP transaction.  
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Financially Constrained Hypothesis 2: Periods in which SEO market activity is low and bond 
issues are high is more likely to be associated with an increased likelihood of public to private 
transactions. 
 
4.1.4. Liquidity Benefits 
 
Many authors have highlighted the significance of liquidity considerations in a firm’s decision 
to go public. Bolton & Von Thadden (1998) and Boot et al. (2008) highlight the importance of 
the trade-off between liquidity and control in firms’ ownership structure decisions. Zingales & 
Rajan (1995) and Mello & Parsons (1998) believe that firms go public to establish a market 
value and, thus, provide liquidity. Consequently, theoretical arguments support the idea that 
liquidity is a benefit of being public. Moreover, public exchange transactions are frequently 
cheaper compared to bilateral trades (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010), a benefit which increases with 
the trading volume. Hence, this study builds on the hypothesis that as liquidity benefits of 
trading in public markets deteriorate, firms are more likely to go private. As a proxy for liquidity 
ILLIQ, as computed in Amihud (2002), and the stock’s turnover will be used. 
Liquidity Hypothesis: Firms with higher liquidity are more likely to exit public markets. 
 
4.1.5. The Agency Problem 
 
Jensen (1986) studies the alignment of interest between managers and shareholders in issues 
such as the optimal size of a firm and cash distributions to shareholders. The author argues that 
debt can have a positive effect on reducing the agency costs of free cash flow (FCF), especially 
for high FCF firms, suggesting that LBOs lead to efficiency gains. This is due to the fact that 
the higher debt burden and, in some cases, the increase of the managers’ equity position leads 
to a higher alignment of understandings between managers and shareholders. In this way, firms 
may wish to go private to improve corporate governance and incentive alignment. Following 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) and Lehn & Poulsen (1989), this hypothesis is studied empirically 
using the ratios of FCF-to-assets, firm leverage, cash to assets and net fixed assets (NFA)-to-
assets. It is expected that firms with high ratios of FCF, cash and NFA-to-assets and low 
leverage are more likely to go private. 
Agency Hypothesis: Firms with greater availability of cash are more likely to exit public markets. 
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4.1.6. Corporate Control 
 
Going public has significant implications over the ownership structure of a company. On one 
hand, it can serve as a way for financial investors, such as venture capitalists and business 
angels, or founders to cash in their investment. On the other hand, it can benefit a firm looking 
for engaging in M&A operations. More precisely, Zingales (1995) claims an IPO to be a first 
step to sell a company at an attractive price through a takeover, while, Brau et al. (2003) and 
Brau & Fawcett (2006) consider that an IPO can be a way for a firm to create a currency, i.e. 
public shares, to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions. This suggests that a 
firm’s activity for corporate control is correlated to the benefits of being publicly listed. Thus, 
if a firm has a low level of activity in corporate control deals, it is more likely to go private. 
The variables that will study this hypothesis are the number of M&A deals a company was 
involved in as an acquirer and the market-to-book ratio, as Zingales (1995) suggests the value 
of the cash flow rights to fluctuate more with market conditions than control rights. Note that, 
this subsection relates to the previous considerations drawn on access to capital as a firm might 
need financing to engage in such deals. 
Moreover, Fidrmuc et al. (2013), among others, find the threat of takeover to be an important 
determinant on the management’s decision to go private, as, often, after a takeover, the 
incumbent management is replaced. Nevertheless, this theory will not be tested due to the lack 
of data sources.  
Control Hypothesis: The likelihood of a firm going private is negatively related to a firm’s 
activity for corporate control. 
 
4.1.7. Window of Opportunity 
 
To conclude this extensive subsection on factors based on firm characteristics, the possible 
performance of a firm’s stock price weight on GP transactions will also be studied. 
Consequently, the excess return of a company’s stock price compared to market return will be 
taken as a variable. Despite, the existing literature not having a unified view on this factor, this 
dissertation will build on the premises that firms which experience high excess returns are more 
likely to go private. There are two main forces behind this premises. Firstly, as Ritter (1991) 
shows there are periods in which stocks are mispriced, firms may take the opportunity to make 
capital gains by exiting public markets. Secondly, firms seeking to engage in strategic 
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acquisitions or private funds cherry picking their portfolio companies may wish to buy top 
performers. 
Window of Opportunity Hypothesis: Firms with lower abnormal returns have lower probability 
of going private. 
 
4.2. Macro Environment 
 
Macroeconomic conditions may also affect the benefits and costs of a firm remaining publicly 
listed, which can ultimately lead to a firm’s decision to go private. The number of different 
market factors that can impact this decision is broad and hard to capture in a single model. This 
study will thus focus on a hand-full of variables that according to past literature can impact a 
firm’s decision to go private. This subsection, as the previous one, is organized by economic 
factor. 
 
4.2.1. Business Cycle and Confidence  
 
This study draws on the premise that business cycles and investors’ expectations of the macro 
environment can influence investors decision on whether to invest their savings in the public or 
private markets. In times of financial crisis or when there are expectations that markets will go 
down, investors will allocate more of their capital on private placements, which can directly 
constrain the liquidity of public markets and may also decrease the valuation premium that, 
historically, public firms frequently trade over private ones (Sarin et al., 2000 and Elnathan, et 
al., 2010). This hypothesis thus considers a substitution effect between public and private 
markets, which can decrease the liquidity and access to capital benefits of public listed firms 
previously mentioned. Accordingly, firms are more likely to go private in times of pessimist 
expectations of the economic environment. 
As a sentiment indicator, this study will make use of the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), 
which reveals the likely evolution of the business cycle activity in Europe and presumably 
captures the optimist and pessimist expectations of the market. 
Confidence Hypothesis: Firms are more likely to go private when the sentiment is low. 
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4.2.2. Private Equity Market 
 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) show both private equity number of deals and value to statistically 
significantly increase the likelihood of a firm going private in the US. Moreover, Bernstein et 
al. (2019), comparing a sample of 722 PE-backed companies in the UK to a carefully selected 
control sample during the 2008 financial crisis, find that PE-backed firms experienced a smaller 
decline in investment than the control group, which can be explained by the use of the private 
equity sponsors’ relationships to raise equity and debt funding and to decrease affiliates’ cost 
of capital. These results are stronger in companies which were more likely to be financially 
constrained and in which the PE funds had more capital available to inject in the portfolio 
companies. Thus, Bernstein et al. (2019) find evidence of their hypothesis that PE sponsors 
lighten financial constraints of affiliated companies in a sudden tightening of credit markets. 
Finally, on the last two decades, although subject to cycles, PE funds have significantly 
increased the amount of assets they have under management in Europe which may boost the 
number of GP transactions. Among others, the increase in PE fundraising amounts has two 
major potential consequences on a firm’s decision to go private. Firstly, as a considerable 
amount of assets is allocated to the same type of companies, increasing their valuation, the 
previously mentioned premium gap between public and private companies may invert. 
Secondly, as good investment opportunities in private markets get scarcer, PEs can look for 
better investments in public markets, taking firms private. 
In this way, by lightening firms’ financial constraints or inverting the premium gap between 
public and private companies or, simply, because they have more funds available, PE funds’ 
investment patterns potentially explain going-private transactions. To test this hypothesis, the 
amount invested in Europe by PE and venture capital (VC) funds will be used as a proxy. 
Private Equity Hypothesis: Firms are more likely to go private in times when PE investments 
are high. 
 
4.2.3. Bank Loans Market 
 
Finally, following the previous analysis of a possible substitution effect between private and 
public capital, a similar phenomenon may also happen with the availability of business loans at 
low costs. As banks extend or lessen the amount of corporate loans to non-financial businesses, 
by simply changing their price (i.e., interest rates) or altering the requirements needed for a 
 21 
corporate loan, the benefits of having access to public capital may change accordingly. It is 
expected that in periods in which interest rates are low or new loans to corporates are high, a 
higher number of firms will go private. Due to the lack of access to databases on all European 
countries’ corporate loans amounts and interest rates, the variables considered are the average 
interest rate on loans to corporates and the amount of new business loans in the Euro Area. 
Bank Loans Hypothesis: Firms are more likely to go private in times of low corporate loans 





Following Bharath & Dittmar (2010), this study will make use of univariate, logit and survival 
analyses to study the motivations of the GP decision in the European markets. 
In subsection 7.1., a univariate analysis is performed to examine the differences in inherent firm 
characteristics between the control and the study sample at IPO year, as well as firm 
characteristics of the GP sample at IPO and at the year prior to going private. In each of these 
two analyses both parametrical mean and non-parametrical median tests are executed. 
Relating firm characteristics at IPO year and in the year prior to going private of the study 
sample, the Paired Data Mean-Comparison t-test and the Sign Test of Matched Pairs are used 
to compare mean and median values, respectively. These paired tests consider the data to be 
collected from the same subjects. The Mean-Comparison test studies the hypothesis that the 
difference between the mean values of different variables is equal to zero and the Sign Test 
takes the null hypothesis that the median of the differences between to variables is zero. 
Comparing the study and control samples at IPO, the Two Sample Mean-Comparison t-test, 
using groups, and the Non-parametric Equality of Medians test, which deliberate on different 
samples, are performed. The Equality of Medians test studies the null hypothesis that the 
samples were retrieved from populations with the same median. 
Furthermore, to analyze whether intrinsic firm characteristics at IPO can determine the GP 
decision, this study recurs to a logit model, in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to one, if the firm went private, or equal to zero, otherwise. The following regression includes 
the most complete set of explanatory variables estimated in the logit analysis: 
 
!"#$%! = '" + '# ln(,-)! + '$/&1_3! + '%4!!45! + '&6789":;8! + ''<=>?@_	3!
+ '(1$:$B;9B	17CCD! + ')EF_4! + '*=GH7$I$%$"9I! + '+,J!
+ '#"!;:;8K#;! + '##L<L_=! + '#$<KIℎ_=! + '#%NL=_=! +	O! 
 
in which !"#$%! is the natural logarithm of the odds of a given firm i going private. The odds 
are given by the ratio between the probability of success (i.e., a given firm i will go private) and 
the probability of failure.  
In contrast to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regressions, the logit model admits the 
dependent variable to be dichotomous by fitting a non-linear function to the data, it allows for 
different marginal effects at the distribution tales and avoids heteroskedasticity. Additionally, 
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while probit regressions also tackle the drawbacks of linear models for this study’s desired 
analysis, by applying logit models, the coefficients can be interpreted in terms of odd ratios. 
For example, one unit increase in the market-to-book ratio increases (decreases) the odds of 
going private by the exponential of '+, if the coefficient is positive (negative). 
Nevertheless, one should keep in mind, when analyzing the logit regressions results, that this 
model involves some important assumptions. Those include low correlation among explanatory 
variables, a linear relationship between the log odds and the independent variables, the 
inexistence of outliers and the independence of observations. Furthermore, this model results 
are more likely to be less accurate if the number of observations is low. Consequently, and to 
study the effect of time-varying characteristics, a survival analysis, using the Cox Hazard Model, 
is also performed. 
Survival analyses are commonly used in clinical trials to relate the survival time of a patient to 
some predictor variables, such as sex or age. While other survival analyses methods, such as 
the Kaplan-Meier survival curves or the Log-rank tests, only study the impact of one predictor 
variable at a time and work best with categorical variables, the Cox Hazard Model enables to 
consider a wide range of different risk factors, categoric or quantitative, simultaneously. 
Furthermore, this statistical method also admits the existence of censured data, i.e., patients or, 
in this study’s case, firms for which the event being study - going private - never occurred.  
In this way, in this study, the Cox Hazard Model analyzes the relationship between the duration 
of public life of firms (i.e., survival time) and firm-specific and macro environment 
characteristics (the predictor variables). The model is estimated as follows: 
ℎ[%, @(%)] = ℎ"(%) 	× ;(-
!×/(0))	 
in which ℎ[%, @(%)] is the hazard rate of a firm at time t,	ℎ"(%) the baseline hazard, '2 is the 
coefficients matrix and @(%) the covariates matrix.  
The hazard rate is the probability with which one firm goes private at time t and the baseline 
hazard is the hazard rate when all covariates take the value zero. Furthermore,  ;- is the hazard 
ratio, which indicates how the hazard or the instantaneous risk of the GP event changes for a 
unit variation in a given explanatory variable. For example, if the coefficient of the risk factor 
Leverage takes the value 0.324, the hazard ratio is given by ;".%$& = 1.383. This means that an 
increase of 1 unit in firm leverage leads to an increase in the hazard rate, or risk of going private, 
of (1.383 − 1) × 100 = 38.3%. If the coefficient is equal to zero, the hazard ratio is equal to 
one and the variable has no impact on the hazard rate. If the coefficient is positive (negative), 
 24 
the hazard ratio is higher (lower) than one, meaning the risk factor causes an increase (reduction) 
in the hazard rate. 
Finally, the Cox Hazard Model also considers some assumptions. Firstly, it assumes a 
proportional hazard, i.e., the hazard of a firm going private is a constant multiple of the hazard 
of another. Secondly, it deems linearity between the log hazard and the risk factors. Lastly, it 




6. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
6.1. Data Collection and Treatment 
 
The Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a going private transaction as: 
 
“When a public company is eligible to deregister a class of its equity securities, either because 
those securities are no longer widely held or because they are delisted from an exchange” (US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, n.d.), 
 
wherein eligibility means that equity securities are held by less than 300 shareholders of record 
or by less than 500 shareholders of record if the firm has a low level of assets. 
Bharath & Ditmar (2010) make use of SEC’s Rule 13e-3 to identify whether a “true going 
private” transaction has occurred, as US companies must file 13E-3 schedules whenever they 
are involved in these types of dealings. According to the researchers, the Rule 13e-3 includes 
MBOs and LBOs by a financial sponsor, as well as acquisitions of a public company by a 
private one that result on the target’s delisting of public markets.  
Notwithstanding, assembling this study’s GP sample based on fillings, such as the 13E-3 
schedules, was not the path taken, given the broad number of stock exchanges in Europe and 
the difficult access to such documents. Instead, the study sample, or GP sample, was constructed 
using the SDC database, making use of this source’s definition of a GP transaction. The SDC 
“flags” an M&A deal as a GP one when a private entity acquires a public company, resulting 
on the target’s delisting of public markets. In addition to the GP filter, only deals in which the 
target company was a European firm were retrieved, no restrictions being established for the 
acquirer. In this way, the base sample is constituted by all GP deals available on the SDC 
database, accounting for 4,383 announced deals between 1983 and 2020. 
Moreover, given that this study aims to explore the differences between the fundamental 
characteristics of companies at IPO and their evolution during public life of a sample group of 
firms, which exited public markets, and a control sample of companies, which went and remain 
public, the IPO date of companies must be gathered. This data was collected by considering the 
first day for which there is a price available on DataStream for a given company. Note that, 
while this approach may not yield the precise IPO date, after checking for consistency with 
other data sources for some companies, the DataStream IPO date was often found to be 
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relatively accurate. Nevertheless, as this study makes use of the IPO year, instead of the precise 
day, these problems are minimized. 
Table 1 provides a comprehensive view of the screens applied to the base sample to build this 
study’s GP sample. 
 
Table 1 – GP sample screens 
Table 1 displays the filters applied to the base sample retrieved from the SDC database. 
Sample Filters Number of Firms 
Total base sample 4,383 




Firms whose SIC Code starts with 6 (Financial, Insurance and      
Real Estate) or 49 (Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services) 
(983) 
Firms for which the DataStream Code is not given (433) 
Firms for which no IPO date was found or whose IPO Date is post 
announcement date and are “dead”, according to DataStream 
database 
(902) 
Non-completed deals (330) 
GP sample 1,735 
 
Firstly, similarly to Bharath & Ditmar (2010), deals in which the target firm’s SIC code starts 
with a 6 (Financial, Insurance and Real Estate) or a 49 (Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services) 
were removed from the sample. Secondly, deals for which the target’s DataStream code was 
not available were also redrawn, as variables will be constructed based on this database. Thirdly, 
to ensure target companies had actually been delisted, only firms that were “dead” according to 
DataStream were kept. Fourthly, transactions whose target firms’ IPO date was not found or 
posterior to the transaction’s announcement date were also erased. Finally, deals which were 
announced, yet not completed, were also removed from the sample. As a result, a screened 
sample of 1,735 European firms which exited public markets between 1985 and the beginning 
of 2020 was obtained. 
These 1,735 European firms are compared to a control sample of 5,684 publicly traded 
European enterprises. The control sample was created by retrieving publicly listed firms in all 
countries in Europe that had firms in the GP sample, for which data was available in the 
DataStream database. To ensure consistency utility and financial firms were excluded from the 
control sample, in addition to those whose industry was unclassified.  
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In order to give a more comprehensive view of the samples used in this study and on the GP 
activity in Europe, in the following subsection descriptive statistics of the study and control 
sample will be presented and analyzed. 
 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This study will analyze data of 1,735 GP transactions which occurred in 39 different countries 
in the European Continent (including Russia), being the first research, to my knowledge, to 
study the GP decision on such a wide range of country-based firms in Europe. Table 2 shows 
the distribution of both study and control samples across these 39 countries.  
While the three main leading nations of the EU, UK, France and Germany, have the highest 
number of exits from public markets (596, 246 and 129, respectively), data shows the UK to 
have experienced a significantly larger number of GP transactions over the years, evidencing 
350 more deals than the second highest ranked country. Note that, Belkhir et al. (2013) also 
find France to be the country in Continental Europe to experience a higher number of GP 
transactions from 2000 to 2009. Closely following Germany, comes Sweden with 121 firms 
exiting financial markets, a Scandinavian country whose financial system has developed 
considerably over the past decades (Stenfors, 2014). 
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Table 2 – Sample distribution by country 
Table 2 displays the GP, column (3), control, column (4) and total, column (5), sample distributions across 
the 39 European countries considered in this study. 
No. Country GP Sample Control Sample Full Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 Austria 15 42 57 
2 Belgium 31 77 108 
3 Bulgaria 13 133 146 
4 Croatia 9 84 93 
5 Cyprus 2 40 42 
6 Czech Republic 12 3 15 
7 Denmark 45 92 137 
8 Estonia 2 12 14 
9 Finland 22 129 151 
10 France 246 600 846 
11 Germany 129 482 611 
12 Greece 23 134 157 
13 Guernsey 1 0 1 
14 Hungary 6 22 28 
15 Iceland 2 13 15 
16 Ireland Republic 26 22 48 
17 Isle of Man 2 0 2 
18 Italy 74 246 320 
19 Jersey 3 0 3 
20 Latvia 3 17 20 
21 Liechtenstein 1 0 1 
22 Lithuania 10 17 27 
23 Luxembourg 4 7 11 
24 Monaco 1 0 1 
25 Netherlands 52 62 114 
26 Norway 86 195 281 
27 Poland 48 583 631 
28 Portugal 14 36 50 
29 Romania 12 126 138 
30 Russian Federation 58 232 290 
31 Serbia 3 93 96 
32 Slovak Republic 2 34 36 
33 Slovenia 6 18 24 
34 Spain 19 112 131 
35 Sweden 121 691 812 
36 Switzerland 28 128 156 
37 Turkey 5 267 272 
38 Ukraine 3 36 39 
39 United Kingdom 596 899 1,495 
Total  1,735 5,684 7,419 
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Table 3 – Sample distribution by IPO and GP year 
Table 3 displays the GP sample by going public year, column (2), and GP year, column (4) and the control 
samples distribution by going public year, column (3). 
 Panel A: Nb. of Firms Going Public Panel B: Nb. of Firms Going 
Private 
Year GP Sample Control Sample GP Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before 1985 173 60 0 
1985 29 17 1 
1986 37 63 0 
1987 53 33 3 
1988 94 199 6 
1989 71 100 5 
1990 42 69 7 
1991 22 43 6 
1992 17 43 6 
1993 44 40 7 
1994 76 97 10 
1995 45 92 21 
1996 85 120 28 
1997 99 172 13 
1998 114 225 57 
1999 97 193 99 
2000 113 254 83 
2001 54 117 60 
2002 41 89 63 
2003 25 60 105 
2004 58 145 60 
2005 73 204 83 
2006 88 374 95 
2007 58 310 98 
2008 24 149 81 
2009 20 204 68 
2010 19 170 79 
2011 11 219 100 
2012 11 164 93 
2013 12 155 85 
2014 16 248 85 
2015 9 245 52 
2016 4 243 52 
2017 0 310 48 
2018 1 247 48 
2019 0 183 26 
2020 0 28 2 
Total 1735 5684 1735 
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Moreover, the GP sample shows European firms to be public, on average, for 11 years, before 
departing from public markets. Table 3 allocates both the GP and control samples according to 
their IPO year and the number of GP deals by delisting year. 
Data shows the number of exits from public listings to have increased considerably since 1998, 
inclusive. From 1998 to 2014, there were, on average, 82 annual deals, varying in a pattern 
close to cycles of short and low frequency. Since 2015, this type of transactions has been 
conducted in smaller numbers, with an average of 45 annual deals, from 2015 to 2019. 
Furthermore, 72% of the deals recorded are domestic, which could either indicate a preference 
of financial investors or strategic acquirers to purchase national companies, or a tendency for 
cross border ultimate parent acquirers to purchase a potential target through an affiliated 
company located in the same country, for example. Also, 21% of the deals were completed 
through an LBO. 
In figure 1 GP deals are organized in three main categories: Strategic Acquisitions, meaning 
whether the acquirer is a private firm; Investment Acquisitions, investors such as private equity 
funds, venture capitalists or individuals; and Management Acquisitions, identifying whether 
management was involved or was the driver of the deal through a MBO. As illustrated by figure 
1, these categories often overlap. 
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Bharath & Dittmar (2010) identify almost 32% of their GP sample of US companies to be 
classified as MBOs. This study finds different statistics in Europe, as only 11% of the 
transactions recorded management involvement. Additionally, a higher number of transactions 
backed by private capital is observed, 40% compared to 15.4% in the US. However, while in 
the US PEs are more likely to invest in an agreement with the incumbent management (44% of 
the deals backed by private equity), in Europe, 85% of the times, private funds do not involve 
managers in the transaction. Notwithstanding, in Europe, MBOs are more frequently financed 
by private funds than by private operating firms, contrarily to the US. 
Finally, appendix 1 displays firms of the GP sample grouped by industry, using Kenneth R. 
French twelve industry classification. The distribution is similar to the one identified in the US 
by Bharath & Dittmar (2010), as manufacturing, business equipment, retail and consumer 
durables firms evidence the highest number of GP deals. Notwithstanding, the number of GP 




7. Empirical Analysis 
7.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
In table 4, the mean and median values of the different variables for each sample in the IPO 
year are presented. Firms which later go private show different characteristics at the listing year, 
compared to firms which remain traded in stock exchanges. More precisely, GP firms are 
smaller, in terms of average sales, market value and assets, have higher levels of FCF and NFA 
and lower levels of cash, all scaled by company assets, and pay more frequently dividends 
during the IPO year. These results are robust to both mean and median comparison tests at the 
1% significance level. Less significant results identify GP firms to be less financially 
constrained, as measured by the KZ index, more liquid, and have higher levels of leverage. No 
differences are found in R&D levels scaled by sales, the number of acquisitions or the market-
to-book ratio. Note that, due to the lack of information on some companies, the number of firms 
included in the computations of the many variables varies. 
These statistics are relatively different from the ones identified in the US by Bharath & Dittmar 
(2010). Considering any significance level at either mean or median difference tests between 
the study and control samples to be relevant, the previously mentioned authors find GP firms 
in the US to have higher assets and sales volume, lower level of R&D-to-sales, lower CAPEX-
to-sales, less liquidity and lower market-to-book ratios, in contrast to this study’s findings in 
the European market. Statistics propose size to be more relevant for European companies in the 
GP decision than for US firms, suggesting European markets to be less attractive for SMEs. 
Furthermore, the only variable not found statistically significant in the US was the number of 
acquisitions. 
Table 5 presents mean and median summary statistics of GP firms at IPO year and the year 
prior to the stock delisting. Note that, descriptive statistics presented in column A of this table 
differ from those of column A of table 4, since in table 5 only companies which had data on the 






Table 4 – Mean and median statistics of the GP and control samples at IPO year 
Table 4 displays the mean (1st line) and median (2nd line) values and the number of observations (3rd line) of 
each firm characteristic of the GP, column A, and control, column B, samples at IPO. The last column 
presents the t-stat (chi-square) of the test of difference in means (medians). *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 GP Sample Control Sample Difference 
 t = IPO year t = IPO year t-stat / chi-square 
 (A) (B) (B)-(A) 
Sales 235.16 460.13 3.85*** 
 41.78 25.74 36.63*** 
 1,078 3,967      
Assets 253.84 579.29 3.63*** 
 48.71 36.80 10.27*** 
 1,077 3,950      
Market Value 193.34 504.70 5.17*** 
 39.66 55.50 25.01*** 
 1,609 3,886      
R&D_S 2.38 6.20 1.47 
 0.02 0.03 0.75 
 158 677      
ILLIQ 0.02 0.03 1.41 
 0.00 0.00 29.21*** 
 1,078 3,290      
Turnover 0.73 0.93 0.88 
 0.21 0.17 11.30*** 
 787 3,403      
CAPEX_S 0.37 2.51 1.04 
 0.05 0.03 65.97*** 
 956 2,743      
KZ_I -27.28 -79.83 -2.24** 
 -0.90 -1.74 2.44 
 240 1,146      
Dividend Dummy 0.47 0.34 -7.28*** 
 0.00 0.00 55.67*** 
 1,010 3,583      
Acquisitions (IPO) 0.18 0.17 -0.58 
 0.00 0.00 1.93 
 1,612 5,676      
MB 4.50 7.92 1.48 
 1.84 1.89 1.02 
 1,047 3,879      
Leverage 0.13 0.13 -0.78 
 0.07 0.06 3.66* 
 1,071 3,736      
FCF_A 0.03 -0.30 -3.82*** 
 0.06 -0.09 19.84*** 
 752 3,198      
Cash_A 0.20 0.25 6.63*** 
 0.13 0.15 9.81*** 
 1,075 3,939      
NFA_A 0.26 0.22 -5.40*** 
 0.19 0.14 31.41*** 
 1,072 3,833  
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Table 5 – Mean and median statistics of the GP sample at IPO and year prior to GP 
Table 5 displays the mean (1st line) and median (2nd line) values and the number of observations (3rd line) of 
each firm characteristic of the GP sample at IPO, column (A), and at the year prior to going private, column 
(B). The last column presents the t-stat (sign test significance) of the test of difference in means (medians). 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  GP Sample GP Sample Difference 
 t = IPO year t = Year prior to going private Paired t-test / Sign test 
  (A) (B) (B)-(A) 
Sales 238.89 467.89 6.64*** 
 42.86 108.01 *** 
 996       
Assets 261.30 536.44 4.96*** 
 52.412 109.27 *** 
 981       
Market Value 189.98 307.62 4.22*** 
 38.96 47.29 *** 
 1,588       
R&D_S 2.41 8.57 0.72 
 0.03 0.02  
 115       
ILLIQ 0.02 0.14 1.23 
 0.00 0.00 *** 
 1,032       
Turnover 0.77 0.25 -4.10*** 
 0.22 0.11 *** 
 694       
CAPEX_S 0.41 0.53 0.46 
 0.05 0.03 *** 
 835       
KZ_I -6.36 -10.27 -1.11 
 -0.91 -1.63  
 105       
Dividend Dummy 0.48 0.55 4.01*** 
 0.00 1.00 *** 
 891       
Acquisitions (IPO) 0.18 0.22 1.79* 
 0.00 0.00 *** 
 1,590       
MB 4.56 1.53 -2.02** 
 1.84 1.24 *** 
 953       
Leverage 0.13 0.15 3.34*** 
 0.07 0.10 ** 
 965       
FCF_A 0.03 0.00 -1.93* 
 0.06 0.06 *** 
 657       
Cash_A 0.21 0.14 -10.29*** 
 0.13 0.08 *** 
 976       
NFA_A 0.26 0.26 0.79 
 0.20 0.20  
  974   
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Statistics on size show GP European firms to grow in sales, assets and market value during their 
public life. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence of a decrease in turnover, indicating a 
decrease in liquidity, an increase in the number of acquisitions, suggesting GP firms to be active 
for corporate control during their public life, an increase in leverage and a decrease in the 
market-to-book, FCF and cash ratios. One interesting finding is that between the IPO year and 
the year prior to delisting the average market-to-book ratio decreases considerably. While this 
can be linked to a company’s activity in the M&A market, it also represents a drop in the 
premium the market puts on the firm. In this way, this could corroborate theories on 
undervaluation motives in Europe documented in past literature. 
Appendix 2 displays the trend of assets, turnover, market-to-book ratio and FCF average values 
of both study and control samples during the first and last five years of firms’ public life. To 
ensure a satisfactory level of consistency, while preserving a reasonable number of sample firms, 
only firms which were public for more than seven years were considered in the construction of 
these graphs. Graphs show variables to evolve in similar trends in both samples in the first five 
years of public life, although exhibiting considerable gaps in average values. Firms which 
remained public are consistently larger in terms of assets, have higher stock turnover, higher 
market-to-book ratios and considerably lower FCFs. 
Panel A of appendix 3 contrasts the cumulative average number of acquisitions for GP firms 
whose public life was under and over five years. A considerable gap exists between the two 
lines, which could support the idea that some firms might go private only for a couple of years 
seeking to engage in a few acquisitions. Moreover, Panel B of appendix 3 exhibits the average 
number of acquisitions around the delisting year (Private 0) for firms that went private before 
2016 and had a public life of at least five years. The trend suggests firms engage in a 
significantly higher number of acquisitions during public life, also supporting the idea that firms 
seek stock exchange listings to carry out M&A transactions. 
Note that, while table 4 suggests GP companies and firms which remain publicly listed to have 
inherent dissimilar characteristics at IPO, table 5 shows these characteristics to vary 
considerably over the public life of a company. If firms which later go private have substantially 
different characteristics at IPO from those that remain public, it could be the case that a firm 
should not have gone public in the first place or that these companies go public with a planned 
exit. Nevertheless, listing on public markets is associated with high costs, hence the decision to 
go public not being made lightly. If going public benefits are slightly above costs, changes in 
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firm characteristics or market conditions, many times not foreseen by company managers or 
advisors, may also determine delisting decisions. 
 
7.2. Logit Analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the results of a logit analysis performed using firm characteristics at IPO. The 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm went private and equal to zero otherwise. 
In contrast to other statistical analyses presented further in this study, the natural logarithm of 
market value is used to proxy firm size, instead of the natural logarithm of sales. This is due to 
the fact that the latter exhibits a significant degree of correlation with other variables, namely 
R&D-to-sales, which could disrupt results. Moreover, the FCF-to-sales variable is also not 
included in any of the four logit regressions, as it holds a sizable negative correlation with the 
market-to-book ratio. Nevertheless, a similar analysis was performed regressing FCF in place 
of the market-to-book ratio, in which the first was found not to be statistically significant, not 
supporting the agency hypothesis. This analysis is presented in appendix 4. 
Regression 1 explores the impact of all firm characteristics at IPO, except for sales, assets and 
FCF, described previously in table 4, presented in subsection 7.1. Results indicate that larger 
firms, with high R&D expenditures and low CAPEX as a percentage of sales at the listing year, 
are less likely to go private. Consequently, findings support the size considerations that smaller 
firms are more likely to go private due to low information availability or to high costs associated 
with remaining publicly listed, among others. Nevertheless, the serendipitous information 
hypothesis is rejected, since high tech firms, with high R&D expenditures and low availability 
of serendipitous information (Subrahmanyam & Titman, 1999), are more prone to remain 
publicly listed. Furthermore, results also reject the financially constrained hypothesis 1, as, 
firms with higher CAPEX-to-sales, in turn, associated with more growth opportunities, are 
more likely to go private, and the KZ index and the dividend dummy are not found significant. 
Finally, firms characterized by an inferior amount of leverage and a sizable market-to-book 
ratio at IPO are more likely to exit public markets. Therefore, the sign and significance of the 
leverage coefficient hint for the potential importance of the agency hypothesis, as low leverage 
firms are more likely to suffer from agency problems. Despite the significance of the market-
to-book ratio, since the acquisitions variable is not significant, so far, it does not seem wise to 
comment on the reliability of the control hypothesis. 
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Table 6 – Logit regressions on the odds of a firm GP using firm characteristics at IPO 
Table 6 displays the results of the logit analysis on the likelihood of a firm going private based on firm 
characteristics at going public year. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm goes private and 
0 otherwise. The table presents the coefficients and, in parentheses, the standard errors. At the end of the 
table, the number of observations, the pseudo R-squared and the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square are 
displayed, for each regression. Variables are defined in appendix 5. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 0.127 -0.516*** 0.239 -0.487*** 
 (0.650) (0.160) (0.672) (0.163) 
ln(MV) -0.205** -0.127*** -0.201** -0.151*** 
 (0.096) (0.029) (0.102) (0.030) 
R&D_S -0.778**  -0.838**  
 (0.357)  (0.368)  
ILLIQ 9.576 -1.486 3.626 -1.646 
 (6.262) (1.099) (6.555) (1.176) 
Turnover -0.061 0.029 -0.070 0.031 
 (0.068) (0.019) (0.068) (0.019) 
CAPEX_S 5.218*** -0.001 5.725*** -0.002 
 (1.646) (0.007) (1.712) (0.010) 
Dividend -0.259 0.176* -0.232 0.200** 
 (0.397) (0.099) (0.425) (0.102) 
KZ_I 0.003  0.003  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Acquisitions (IPO) 0.149 0.047   
 (0.171) (0.059)   
MB 0.090** 0.008 0.093** 0.010 
 (0.042) (0.007) (0.150) (0.046) 
Leverage -1.660* -0.678** -2.562** -1.026*** 
 (0.979) (0.289) (0.042) (0.007) 
Cash_A -0.773 -0.098 -0.828 -0.134 
 (0.953) (0.241) (1.300) (0.321) 
NFA_A -1.043 1.141*** -2.134 1.195*** 
 (1.218) (0.233) (0.985) (0.248) 
Acquisitions (IPO + 1)   0.276* 0.149*** 
   (1.465) (0.242) 
   
  
Obs 260 2,246 255 2,210 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.154 0.021 0.178 0.029 
LR Chi-Square 43.64*** 57.59*** 47.73*** 76.47*** 
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Although regression 1 has a pseudo R-squared of 15.4%, higher than the ones reported by 
Bharath & Dittmar (2010) in a similar analysis (6-8%), the number of observations is relatively 
low6, raising concerns on the reliability of the logit regression and on the applicability of these 
results to a larger sample of firms. The number of observations is significantly reduced by the 
lack of data for R&D and the KZ index. In this way, regression 2 excludes these two variables, 
increasing the number of observations to 2,246, though decreasing the pseudo R-squared.  
Coefficients on size and leverage of regression 2 are consistent in sign and evince further 
statistical significance as compared to regression 1. Furthermore, although CAPEX-to-sales has 
lost its significance, this regression suggests high property, plant and equipment firms, in 
general, associated with high capital expenditures, to be more likely to go private. Additionally, 
howbeit the market-to-book ratio has lost significance, the frequency with which a company 
pays dividends at the IPO year has a statistically significant positive correlation with the 
likelihood of going private. 
Previously, mean and median differences analysis highlighted the insignificance of the number 
of acquisitions at IPO year, which is sustained by the logit analysis. Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming procedures of listing in a public stock exchange may cause firms which go public 
to follow an acquisition strategy to delay their activity in M&A deals. In this way, regression 3 
and 4, which are similar in every other aspect to regressions 1 and 2, respectively, have been 
run to study whether the number of acquisitions in the year following IPO (IPO + 1) affects the 
probability of a firm going private. Indeed, a positive and significant relationship was found, 
suggesting the benefits of being public to engage in M&A transactions to be important in a 
firm’s decision to go public. In turn, if instead of being a long-term strategy, firms go public to 
engage in a specific or a small number of acquisitions, they may exit public markets once those 
transactions have been completed. This hypothesis was previously signaled by panel A of 
appendix 3, as short-lived public firms conducted, on average, a superior number of acquisitions 
during the first years of public life, compared to companies with a public life longer than five 
years. Note that including the number of acquisitions at the year following the IPO has increased 
the pseudo R-squared to 17.8% (regression 3). Conclusions on other variables are similar to the 
ones obtained before.  
In an analogous analysis, Bharath & Dittmar (2010) find evidence of all information, liquidity 
and FCF hypotheses. Similarly, this study findings, based on characteristics at IPO, suggest 
 
6 Regression 1 runs firm characteristics on the probability of going private using 61 firms which exited public 
markets and 199 which did not. 
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information considerations to be relevant, as this study identifies a potential misfit of public 
European markets to SMEs. Contrarily, this study’s results indicate companies with low 
leverage at IPO to be more prone to exit public markets, hence giving support to the financially 
constrained hypothesis 1. Finally, insignificant liquidity concerns point out to similar stock 
liquidity in European stock exchanges of both going private and remaining public firms. 
In conclusion, firms that eventually exit public markets seem to have different inherent 
characteristics at IPO than companies which do not. Optimal decisions of managers to go public 
entail benefits of being traded on a stock exchange for GP firms at IPO to be slightly higher 
than costs, hence changes during the public life potentially causing this balance to evert. As 
well, it can signal going public decisions with a planned exit. Non-optimal decisions of 
managers illustrate European public markets not to be fit for all types of firms. However, when 
concluding on these results, one should keep in mind that the logit analysis has limitations, as 
it is a simplistic representation of reality. The following subsection exhibits the survival analysis 
results of the influence of time-varying firm-specific characteristics on the GP decision. 
 
7.3. Survival Analysis 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the Cox Hazard Model, using panel data since the IPO year to 
the year prior to going private, in which the dependent variable is the likelihood of a firm exiting 
public markets.  
Regression 1 runs all firm characteristics, including R&D-to-Sales and the KZ index, 
constraining the number of failures (i.e. GP firms) to 202. This regression’s output gives 
evidence of smaller firms with low market-to-book ratios and low levels of fixed assets as a 
percentage of total assets to be more likely to go private. As a consequence, the relationship 
previously identified in the logit analysis between the market-to-book ratio and the NFA-to-








Table 7 – Cox Hazard regressions on the hazard rate of GP based on firm 
characteristics over public life 
Table 7 displays the results of the Cox Proportional-Hazard Model on the likelihood of a firm going private 
based on time-varying firm characteristics over firms’ public lives. The table presents the coefficients and, 
in parentheses, the standard errors. At the end of the table, the total number of observations, the number of 
failures, i.e. firms for which the GP event occurred, and the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square are displayed, 
for each regression. Variables are defined in appendix 5. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
ln(Sales) -0.187*** -0.118*** -0.187*** -0.116*** 
 (0.040) (0.017) (0.040) (0.017) 
R&D_S 0.001  0.001  
 (0.001) 
 (0.001)  
ILLIQ 0.362 0.035*** 0.361 0.035*** 
 (0.435) (0.011) (0.436) (0.011) 
Turnover -0.034 -0.159*** -0.034 -0.146** 
 (0.082) (0.058) (0.082) (0.058) 
CAPEX_S 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) 
Dividend Dummy -0.267 -0.112 -0.266 -0.110 
 (0.168) (0.072) (0.168) (0.072) 
KZ_I 0.000  0.000  
 (0.000) 
 (0.000)  
Acquisitions 0.084 0.029 0.084 0.031 
 (0.086) (0.038) (0.086) (0.038) 
MB -0.131** -0.102*** -0.131** -0.098*** 
 (0.062) (0.030) (0.062) (0.030) 
Leverage 0.543 0.324*** 0.543 0.315*** 
 (0.344) (0.089) (0.344) (0.090) 
FCF_A 0.009 -0.016 0.008 -0.007 
 (0.243) (0.078) (0.245) (0.052) 
Cash_A 0.507 0.027 0.506 0.070 
 (0.546) (0.255) (0.547) (0.247) 
NFA_A -1.311*** 0.012 -1.311*** 0.017 
 (0.477) (0.142) (0.477) (0.142) 
Abnormal Return   0.004 -0.188*** 
 
  (0.106) (0.062) 
 
    
Obs 11,439 51,918 11,439 51,909 
Number of Failures 202 1,047 202 1,047 
LR Chi-square 68.73*** 108.43*** 68.74*** 119.31*** 
 
Regression 2 verifies the robustness of regression 1 results by excluding R&D-to-sales and the 
KZ index to increase the number of failures and, consequently, improve the confidence in 
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results. Regression 2 suggests previous results on NFA scaled by total assets’ impact on the 
decision to go private to restrain to the 202 failures considered previously, as this variable loses 
significance using a larger sample. Furthermore, size and market-to-book ratio effects on the 
likelihood of exit appear to be robust. As previously discussed, while in subsection 4.1 the 
market-to-book ratio was stated to study control considerations on the GP decision, the 
statistical insignificance of the number of acquisitions variable does not provide the necessary 
confidence to argue the importance of corporate control. In fact, the market-to-book ratio is 
often used in literature to proxy for other considerations such as risk or mispricing. Bloomfield 
& Michaely (2004) argue firms with high market-to-book ratios to be perceived as riskier and 
overpriced by professional investors and Sannajust et al. (2015) find the typical GP firm to be 
undervalued. Consequently, undervaluation considerations suggest high market-to-book firms 
to be less likely to go private, which is consistent with this study findings. 
Moreover, both liquidity variables gain significance, supporting the liquidity hypothesis that 
inferior stock liquidity firms are more likely to go private. Finally, whereas the logit analysis 
indicates that firm leverage at IPO was negatively correlated to stock market exits, the survival 
analysis suggests companies with lower leverage have more propensity to remain public, not 
supporting the agency hypothesis. Recall that it was this study premise that a higher amount of 
leverage decreased agency problems through superior interest payments that, in turn, decrease 
cash availability. As Bharath & Dittmar (2010) suggest, this relationship might be explained by 
the need for restructuring.   
Comparing table 6 and table 7 regressions 1 and 2 results, only the coefficient on size is 
consistent in terms of significance and sign. Although, these two types of analysis are not 
directly comparable, as, among others, models have different assumptions and regress on 
different samples, in addition to firm characteristics at the listing year, the path a firm takes 
during its public life is likely to be essential on a firm’s decision to go private. 
Regressions 3 and 4 replicate regressions 1 and 2, including abnormal returns of firm stocks. 
Results show the sign and significance of other variables coefficients not to change and, when 
considering a higher number of failures (regression 4), abnormal returns are statistically 
significant in predicting a stock market exit. The relation implies firms with high abnormal 
returns to be more likely to remain listed. 
In this way, using the Cox Hazard Model to predict the likelihood of a GP transaction, according 
to firm characteristics, we conclude firms are more likely to go private if they are small, illiquid, 
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have low market-to-book ratios and large amounts of leverage. This supports size and liquidity 
hypothesis. Despite the significance of the market-to-book ratio, as the acquisitions variable 
coefficient is not significant, it is not reasonable to conclude there is evidence of the control 
hypothesis. A low market-to-book ratio may also be associated with underpricing, characteristic 
previous literature (e.g. Renneboog et al., 2006 and Sannajust et al., 2015) found to be linked 
to GP transactions. Further, it rejects the window of opportunity hypothesis as high stock market 
performers are more likely to remain publicly traded. Leverage results are different from the 
ones expected. A higher propensity of high leverage firms going private is not consistent with 
the agency hypothesis. Given that, the ratio of NFA-to-assets is only statistically significant 
using a restricted sample and that no other proxies for agency considerations are both consistent 
with theory and significant, no evidence for the agency hypothesis is found. Finally, table 7 
results also do not support the financially constrained hypothesis. 
At odds, in the US, the survival analysis conveyed by Bharath & Dittmar (2010) indicates large 
firms to be more likely to go private. Nevertheless, authors find the lack of information 
availability, as measured by the number of analysts following the firm, to be associated with a 
higher hazard rate of going private. Regarding liquidity, researchers’ results are weaker, as 
despite arriving at similar conclusions on the turnover coefficient, the ILLIQ variable is not 
significant. Moreover, both the market-to-book ratio and the number of acquisitions are 
significant and consistent with the control hypothesis. The agency hypothesis is supported by 
the correspondence between high cash and FCF-to-assets ratios and higher hazard rate of going 
private. Nevertheless, the coefficient on FCF is only significant in an early subsample period. 
Finally, contrarily to this study, the significance and sign of the KZ index and the dividend 




Table 8 – Cox Hazard regressions on the hazard rate of GP based on firm-specific and 
macro environment characteristics over public life 
Table 8 displays the results of the Cox Proportional-Hazard Model on the likelihood of a firm going private 
based on time-varying firm and macro environment characteristics over firms’ public lives. The table presents 
the coefficients and, in parentheses, the standard errors. At the end of the table, the total number of 
observations, the number of failures, i.e. firms for which the GP event occurred, and the likelihood ratio (LR) 
chi-square are displayed, for each regression. Variables are defined in appendix 5. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 
ln(Sales) -0.119*** -0.149*** -0.119*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
ILLIQ 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Turnover -0.136** 0.000 -0.171*** -0.283*** -0.284*** 
 (0.060) (0.007) (0.060) (0.080) (0.079) 
CAPEX_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Dividend Dummy -0.178** -0.281*** -0.125* -0.389*** -0.383*** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.081) (0.081) 
Acquisitions 0.023 0.025 0.024 -0.023 -0.011 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) 
MB -0.066** -0.071** -0.114**** -0.111*** -0.100*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
Leverage 0.330*** 0.256*** 0.350*** 0.440*** 0.417*** 
 (0.079) (0.088) (0.090) (0.085) (0.085) 
FCF_A 0.007 -0.002 -0.009 0.001 0.003 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.058) (0.050) (0.041) 
Cash_A 0.066 -0.006 0.070 0.110 0.082 
 (0.244) (0.245) (0.249) (0.273) (0.273) 
NFA_A -0.114 0.232 -0.005 -0.294* -0.297* 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.166) (0.167) 
Abnormal Return -0.225*** -0.136** -0.178*** -0.015 -0.076 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.053) (0.060) 
PE Investment Amount -0.023***      (0.002)     
ESI  -0.018***      (0.004)    
Number of IPOs  -0.150***      (0.024)    
Number of SEOs  -0.900***      (0.057)    
Number of Bond Issues   0.414***      (0.057)   
EA Int. Rate on Bus. Loans   0.467***      (0.027)  
EA Banks Loans to PIB     7.614***      (0.462)       
Obs 51,892 51,909 51,909 44,235 44,235 
Number of Failures 1,047 1,047 1,047 811 811 
LR Chi-Square 427.68*** 1381.14*** 167.04*** 379.39*** 363.28*** 
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 In this way, European GP transactions are perceived to exhibit different motivation 
characteristics than the ones in the US. This analysis is complemented by considering the effect 
of changes on the macro environment on firm characteristics and on the decision to go private 
itself.  
The regressions’ output of the probability to go private on firm characteristics and macro 
variables, using the Cox Hazard Model, are described in table 8. Regressions were carefully 
built in order to minimize the existence of correlated variables in the same explanatory model. 
To avoid restricting the study sample to a small number of firms, the R&D-to-sales and the KZ 
index variables were not included, hence firm-specific variables are the ones admitted in 
regression 4 of table 7. 
Firstly, regression 1, in addition to firm characteristics, considers the amount invested by PEs 
and VCs during a given fiscal year, in billion euros. Results reject the private equity hypothesis, 
as an increase in the amount invested leads to a decrease in the likelihood of firms going private. 
These results suggest that private equity investors are still more prone to invest in private firms, 
even when funding is high. In this way, the European GP market seems not to be driven by the 
private equity investment amount. 
Secondly, regression 2 studies the impact of the ESI and the number of IPOs and SEOs on the 
decision to go private. As expected, in periods in which confidence is low, firms are more likely 
to exit public markets, providing evidence for the confidence hypothesis. In turn, periods in 
which there is a high volume of IPOs are associated with a higher probability of firms remaining 
public, suggesting that when stock markets are suitable to enter, fewer firms wish to leave 
public markets. Additionally, in intensified SEO markets, associated with a lower cost to raise 
external capital, companies are less inclined to go private, consistently with the financially 
constrained hypothesis 2.  
Thirdly, regression 3 considers, in addition to firm characteristics, the number of bond issues. 
The coefficient of this macro variable indicates strong bond markets, an alternative source of 
funding to equity and other types of debt financing, to be associated with increased expectations 
of GP transactions. Hence, further supporting the financially constrained hypothesis 2. 
Fourthly, regression 4 analyzes the impact of the Euro Area interest rate on business loans to 
non-financial companies on the expectations of GP transactions. The model exhibits interest 
rates on business loans to be significantly and positively related to the likelihood of going 
private, neglecting the bank loan hypothesis regarding interest rates. Whereas the inverse 
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relationship was expected, as this variable measures the price of bank loans, which are an 
alternative source of funding to equity financing, two main reasons for this relationship can be 
identified. Firstly, in addition to this variable being constrained to euro area data, it is also 
limited to a small period of time and, despite the latter not affecting the accuracy of regressions, 
as the Cox Hazard Model only uses observations for which it has sufficient information on, it 
restricts the time period analysis. Secondly, by analyzing the data, one can verify that in periods 
of financial crisis, as it was the case in 2008 and 2009, the demand for capital increases 
substantially, consequently raising its price. In turn, as demonstrated by the ESI coefficient of 
regression 2, periods of financial crisis and low confidence are associated with a higher number 
of GP transactions. 
Lastly, in regression 5, the Euro Area new bank loans amount impact was also studied. The 
coefficient evidences a positive and significant relationship between this variable and the 
likelihood of an exit, thus supporting the bank loans hypothesis. Bank loans are not only an 
alternative source of financing for companies as also a traditional means of financing of GP 
transactions (LBOs). Nevertheless, this analysis has the same shortcomings as regression 3, 
regarding the availability of data. 
When macro variables are included, previous subsection results on size, liquidity, leverage and 
abnormal returns are consistent with the exception of abnormal returns on regression 4 of table 
8, which loses significance. Furthermore, by controlling the regression to the macro 
environment, the dividend dummy has gained significance, implying companies which pay 
more frequently dividends to be less likely to exit public markets. While in subsection 4.1 has 
been conjectured that low dividend frequency paying firms would be more financially 
constrained, hence this finding rejecting the financially constrained hypothesis 1, it can also be 
the case that managers use dividends to signal sound financial health and future growth 
prospects to investors (Bhattacharya, 1979). 
Indeed, the GP decision in Europe appears to be the result of both macro and firm-specific 
characteristics. Despite their relationship with the dependent variable, in this empirical study, 
macro variables always exhibit a high significance level, indicating the macro environment to 
be very important in determining stock market exits. 
Up to this point in the analysis, the 39 different European countries, whose firms’ characteristics 
have enabled this broad analysis of the European GP transaction determinants, have been 
treated as one large country whose corporate landscapes, legal environment and financial 
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markets are similar. In reality, many of these countries have significant differences which may 
entail different considerations and motivations in the decision to exit public stock markets. 
Consequently, this study analysis was complemented with a subgroup analysis in efforts to 
determine whether country-specific characteristics can alter results.  
Four subsample groups were built according to their economic influences. Group 1 is 
constituted by countries of English influence (Guernsey, Isle of Man, Ireland Republic and the 
UK), group 2 by Central Europe and South origin countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland), group 3 by Eastern Europe countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Turkey and Ukraine) and, finally group 4 is composed by countries of Scandinavian influence 
(Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden). Appendix 6 
presents a list of the different subsample groups constituents and the corresponding number of 
firms considered. Note that, the construction of all different groups does not entail a perfect 
homogeneity of corporate and financial markets environment. Many differences still persist 
within the groups. Nevertheless, the number of observations limits, to a considerable extent, the 
in-depth with which this subsample analysis can be performed. Still, it should provide adequate 
insights on how country differences can impact the GP decision.  
Table 9 displays the hazard model estimation of the subgroup survival analysis, using firm 




Table 9 – Cox Hazard regressions of the subsample analysis on the hazard rate of GP 
based on firm characteristics over public life 
Table 9 displays the results of the Cox Proportional-Hazard Model on the likelihood of a firm going private 
based on time-varying firm characteristics over firms’ public lives. Regressions differ on the subsample of 
firms considered: firms of English influence countries, panel A, Central and South European firms, panel B, 
East Europe firms, panel C, and Scandinavian ones, panel D. For a more comprehensive view of the 
subsample groups see appendix 6. The table presents the coefficients and, in parentheses, the standard errors. 
At the end of the table, the total number of observations, the number of failures, i.e. firms for which the GP 
event occurred, and the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square are displayed, for each regression. Variables are 
defined in appendix 5. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A:  
Group 1 
Panel B:  
Group 2 
Panel C:  
Group 3 
Panel D:  
Group 4 
ln(Sales) -0.122*** -0.182*** 0.077 -0.128*** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.065) (0.039) 
ILLIQ 0.364 -5.765*** 0.047*** 0.217 
 (1.177) (1.464) (0.011) (0.183) 
Turnover -0.017 -0.060 -1.446 0.125*** 
 (0.031) (0.151) (0.414) (0.039) 
CAPEX_S -0.001 -0.003 -0.026 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.101) (0.008) 
Dividend Dummy -0.062 -0.130 -1.081 -0.314* 
 (0.127) (0.116) (0.281) (0.170) 
Acquisitions 0.088 -0.268*** 0.097 0.050 
 (0.057) (0.101) (0.172) (0.077) 
MB -0.229*** -0.048 -0.062 -0.192*** 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.135) (0.074) 
Leverage 0.552*** 0.113 0.826*** 0.364 
 (0.153) (0.203) (0.290) (0.410) 
FCF_A 0.316 -0.075 0.111 -0.059 
 (0.279) (0.344) (0.379) (0.084) 
Cash_A 0.005 -0.527 -0.161 0.051 
 (0.509) (0.533) (1.377) (0.567) 
NFA_A 0.761*** -0.559** 0.307 0.113 
 (0.194) (0.263) (0.523) (0.341) 
Abnormal Return -0.538*** 0.045 -0.017 -0.124 
 (0.120) (0.054) (0.143) (0.132) 
 
    
Obs 9,580 21,181 10,542 10,606 
Number of Failures 359 421 73 194 
LR Chi-Square 102,30*** 87,21*** 61,14*** 45,85*** 
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Panel A shows companies of English influence countries to be more likely to exit public 
markets if they are small, have low market-to-book ratios, high leverage, high NFA-to-assets 
ratios and experienced lower abnormal returns. Thus, results are consistent with the size 
hypothesis, although inconsistent with the window of opportunity hypotheses, as the inverse 
relationship is proven and significant. FCF and cash-to-assets variables remain insignificant 
and leverage and the NFA-to-assets ratio exhibit the opposite relation to the one expected, hence 
not sustaining the financially constrained hypothesis 1, similarly to Renneboog et al. (2006) 
findings in the UK. Finally, the market-to-book ratio coefficient supports the idea that 
undervalued firms are more prone to exit public markets, a relationship also identified by 
Renneboog et al. (2006). 
Panel B indicates firms of Central and South Europe countries to be more likely to exit public 
markets if they are small, enjoy stock liquidity, have conducted few acquisitions over their 
public life and have low ratios of NFA-to-assets. Consequently, the output supports size and 
control hypotheses. Findings on liquidity considerations, however, are peculiar, as illiquidity is 
a characteristic more prevalent in firms which remain public. Moreover, the NFA-to-assets ratio 
also exhibits the expected relationship at a statistically significant level, supporting the 
financially constrained hypothesis. Recall that large NFA firms are, in general, more capital 
intensive, hence needing large amounts of funding. Consistently with Belkhir et al. (2013) 
findings in France, there is no evidence of low growth opportunities to be a determinant in 
delisting decisions. Inconsistently, undervaluation and FCF considerations are not supported by 
this subsample group analysis. Furthermore, this analysis also supports smaller firms to be more 
likely to delist, a relationship not identified in Italy by Bettinelli et al. (2011). 
Panel C highlights the importance of firm leverage for Eastern European firms in the likelihood 
of going public, as high leverage firms are more prone to exit stock markets, suggesting the 
existence of restructuring motives in the GP decision. Furthermore, consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis, companies with illiquid stocks are also more likely to delist from stock exchanges. 
Notwithstanding, as the number of failures is relatively small, these results may not sustain in 
broader sample analysis. 
Lastly, Panel D underlines companies of countries with Scandinavian influence to be more 
likely to go private if they are small, have high turnover, distribute dividends with low 
frequency and exhibit low market-to-book ratios. In turn, results are consistent with the size 
hypothesis and the idea that undervalued firms go private. Nevertheless, they are inconsistent 
with liquidity considerations and the financially constrained hypothesis 1. 
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In conclusion, the empirical results of this study indicate country-specific characteristics, such 
as financial markets functioning and corporate culture, to be prominent on the determinants of 
GP transactions. Still, some firm-specific characteristics, as size, market-to-book ratios or 
leverage, are consistently relevant in the GP decision.  
When analyzing results displayed in table 9, one should keep in mind that this analysis has 
limitations. More precisely, subsample groups’ constituents still possess significant differences 
regarding financial markets functioning, legal environment and corporate culture, hence results 
potentially being driven by large observation countries. Additionally, a small subsample of 
observations for such an extensive period of study may also mislead results. Furthermore, the 




8. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
This study aims to provide a broad, exhaustive and comprehensive view of the determinants of 
GP transactions in Europe based on firm-specific and macro environment characteristics. The 
sample under analysis is constituted by 1,735 firms which went private in 39 different European 
countries between 1985 and 2020 and 5,684 companies that remain, to the sample collection 
moment, publicly listed in European stock markets. Following Bharath & Dittmar (2010), an 
extensive statistical analysis is conducted, comprising univariate, logit and survival analyses. 
The univariate analysis results highlight two main thoughts. Firstly, mean and median values 
of GP firms’ characteristics at the IPO year are often statistically different from the ones of 
companies that remain publicly listed. Secondly, firm-specific characteristics of GP companies 
change considerably over their public life. In this way, the univariate analysis suggests both 
inherent characteristics at IPO and their evolution over time to be relevant in determining a GP 
transaction. In turn, the logit analysis also supports this idea that European companies, which 
later exit public stock markets, have distinctive characteristics at IPO. GP firms are recurrently 
found to be smaller in market value and have lower amounts of leverage at the listing year. 
This study’s most complete statistical analysis, and least common in this field of research, is 
the survival analysis, using the Cox Hazard model. Substantial evidence is found that European 
stock markets are more fit to large firms than SMEs and the liquidity benefits of publicly listed 
firms to be an important factor in the decision to remain publicly listed. Furthermore, results 
also sustain the idea that undervalued firms and companies that experience low abnormal 
returns are more prone to delist from public markets, strengthening the idea that stock 
performance weights on the GP decision. Moreover, in contrast to the logit analysis, the Cox 
Model results indicate a firm’s leverage amount to be positively correlated with the likelihood 
of going private, suggesting GP European firms to have acquired significant amounts of 
leverage during their public life. Finally, no evidence is found that supports agency problems 
to weight in stock delisting decisions. 
All macro variables considered in this study statistically significantly impact the likelihood of 
a firm going private, indicating that, in addition to firm characteristics, the macro environment 
is a critical determinant of GP transactions. Analyzing a variety of external factors, this study 
finds PE investment amounts not to be a driver of GP transactions and business cycles and agent 
confidence to be relevant in stock market delisting. Additionally, periods of hot IPO markets 
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are associated with a lower likelihood of firms going private, suggesting fewer firms wish to 
delist their stocks when financial markets are favorable for new entrants.  
Regarding access to capital considerations, while there is no evidence indicating firms which 
remain public to be more financially constrained, the supply of alternative sources of funding 
does impact the GP decision. More precisely, firms are more likely to remain public in times of 
favorable SEO markets and more prone to exit in times of hot bond markets and high bank 
loans supply. 
Finally, while the subsample group analysis indicates some characteristics, such as size or 
leverage, to be common determinants in the GP decision in different markets, the importance 
of other factors varies considerably. In this way, European regulatory authorities should focus 
their efforts to create more affable public stock markets on a country by country basis or on a 
group by group basis of countries with similar financial markets and corporate culture. 
Moreover, it is also likely that the legal environment of each European country impacts to a 
significant extent the likelihood of going private, an interesting topic for future research. This 
study could also be complemented by considering the motivations of GP transactions according 
to industry, as different industries are likely to weight differently the benefits and costs of being 
public.  
Company managers and shareholders should evaluate carefully the benefits and costs of going 
public. If benefits are slightly above costs, it is likely that macro or firm-specific factors will 
change in such a way that will evert this balance. In turn, overburden emerging from listing and 
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GP sample distribution by Kenneth R. French’s twelve industry classification 
Appendix 1 displays the GP sample distribution by industry groups, according to Kenneth R. French’s twelve 
industry classification. 
No. Industry Description Number of Firms 
1 Consumer Nondurables 214 
2 Consumer durables 65 
3 Manufacturing 477 
4 Energy 45 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 46 
6 Business Equipment 281 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 51 
8 Utilities 0 
9 Shops 230 
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 103 
11 Finance 0 
12 Others 223 




Evolution of firm characteristics after IPO and before GP 
Appendix 2 displays the average values of firm characteristics for both control and GP samples, at IPO and the following four years and five years before GP. Only 
firms whose public life was equal or longer than seven years were included. IPO 0 is the listing year, IPO+1 the year following the listing year and so on. GP-1 is the 
year prior to the exit of public stock markets and so on. Firm characteristics studied are the value of assets (panel A) turnover (panel B) Market-to-Book ratio (panel C) 
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Appendix 3 
GP firms’ involvement in acquisitions 
Appendix 3 comprises two panels which study the GP sample firms involvement in acquisitions. Panel A depicts the evolution of the cumulative average number of 
acquisitions of GP firms at the listing year and the following four years. Two subsample groups of GP firms are considered: firms whose public lives was shorter or 
equal to five years and those whose public live was longer. IPO 0 is the listing year, IPO+1 the year following the listing year and so on. Panel B depicts the average 
number of acquisitions conducted by GP sample firms around the GP year (Private 0). Private+1 is the year following and Private-1 the year prior to stock market 
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 61 
Appendix 4 
Logit regressions on the odds of a firm GP using firm characteristics at IPO 
Appendix 4 displays the results of the logit analysis on the likelihood of a firm going private based on firm 
characteristics at going public year, using the variable FCF_A, instead of MB. The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to 1 if a firm goes private and 0 otherwise. The table presents the coefficients and, in 
parentheses, the standard errors. At the end of the table, the number of observations, the pseudo R-squared 
and the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square are displayed, for each regression. Variables are defined in appendix 
5. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 0.369 -0.766*** 0.489 -0.736*** 
 (0.637) (0.179) (0.658) (0.183) 
ln(MV) -0.223** -0.010*** -0.222** -0.129*** 
 (0.098) (0.032) (0.105) (0.033) 
R&D_S -0.710**  -0.771**  
 (0.326)  (0.335)  
ILLIQ 9.175 -0.768 3.514 -0.853 
 (6.342) (0.944) (6.266) (1.014) 
Turnover -0.069 0.024 -0.076 0.027 
 (0.068) (0.025) (0.067) (0.025) 
CAPEX_S 5.258*** -0.001 5.763*** -0.001 
 (1.631) (0.003) (1.693) (0.004) 
Dividend -0.159 0.236** -0.143 0.271** 
 (0.397) (0.115) (0.427) (0.119) 
KZ_I 0.003  0.004  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Acquisitions (IPO) 0.081 0.007   
 (0.181) (0.067)   
Leverage -1.491 -0.455 -2.519* -0.820** 
 (1.043) (0.299) (1.332) (0.337) 
FCF_A 0.712 -0.138 0.797 -0.171 
 (1.07) (0.215) (1.008) (0.218) 
Cash_A 0.548 -0.296 0.619 -0.308 
 (1.453) (0.378) (1.485) (0.384) 
NFA_A -1.337 0.943*** -2.357 0.993*** 
 (1.207) (0.252) (1.441) (0.263) 
Acquisitions (IPO + 1)   0.258* 0.160*** 
   (0.150) (0.053) 
     
Obs 255 1,886 250 1,854 
Pseudo R-Square 0.135 0.015 0.157 0.023 






Appendix 5 displays this study’s variables description, the scale in which they are considered and the database 
they were retrieved from. 
Variable Name Description Scale Database 
Abnormal Returns 
Difference between the annual 
accumulated return of stock i and the 
accumulated return of the Euro Stoxx 50 
index. Data available since 1987. 
Units DataStream 
Acquisitions 
Number of M&A transactions, in which 
the firm was an acquirer, excluding 
divestitures. 
Units SDC 





CAPEX_S Ratio of capital expenditures to sales. Units DataStream 
Cash_A Ratio of cash and short-term investments 
to book value of assets. 
Units DataStream 
Dividend Dummy 
Equals 1 if the company paid cash 
dividends in a given fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. 
Units DataStream 
EA Bank Loans to 
Businesses 
Ratio of new business loans to non-
financial corporations to GDP in the Euro 





ES Int. Rate on 
Business Loans 
Cost of borrowing for corporations in the 





ESI European Union economic sentiment 






Ratio of free cash flow to book value of 
assets, as computed in Bharath & Dittmar 
(2010). 
Units DataStream 
ILLIQ Illiquidity measure as computed in 
Amihud (2002). 
Units DataStream 
KZ_I KZ index as described by Lamont, Polk 
and Saa-Requejo (2001). 
Units DataStream 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total liabilities 
and shareholders equity. 
Units DataStream 
Market Value 
Annual average of the product of the 





MB Ratio of market to book value of assets. Units DataStream 
NFA_A Ratio of property, plant and equipment to 
book value of assets. 
Units DataStream 
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Number of Bond Issues 
Yearly number of corporate bond issues 
by European companies. Data available 
since 1976. 
Units SDC 
Number of IPOs 
Yearly number of initial public offerings 
of European firms. Data available since 
1972. 
Units SDC 
Number of SEOs 
Yearly number of seasoned equity 
offering issues by European firms. Data 
available since 1986. 
Units SDC 
PE Investment Amount 
Private equity and venture capital 
investment amounts in Europe. Data 









R&D_S Ratio of research and development 
expenditures to sales. 
Units DataStream 




Annual average of the daily ratio of the 
number of traded shares and the number 









Country Groups for the Subsample Analysis  
Appendix 6 displays the constituents of the four country groups considered in the subsample analysis, whose 
results are displayed in subsection 7.3. 
Description Constituents Nb. 
Group 1  1,561 
 Guernsey 1 
 Iceland 15 
 Ireland Republic 48 
 Isle of Man 2 
 United Kingdom 1,495    
Group 2  2,614 
 Austria 57 
 Belgium 108 
 Czech Republic 15 
 France 846 
 Germany 611 
 Greece 157 
 Italy 320 
 Liechtenstein 1 
 Luxembourg 11 
 Monaco 1 
 Netherlands 114 
 Portugal 50 
 Slovak Republic 36 
 Spain 131 
 Switzerland 156    
Group 3  1,799 
 Bulgaria 146 
 Croatia 93 
 Cyprus 42 
 Hungary 28 
 Poland 631 
 Romania 138 
 Russian Federation 290 
 Serbia 96 
 Slovenia 24 
 Turkey 272 
 Ukraine 39    
Group 4  1,442 
 Denmark 137 
 Estonia 14 
 Finland 151 
 Latvia 20 
 Lithuania 27 
 Norway 281 
  Sweden 812 
 
